UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

1-5-2016

State v. Smith Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42962

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Smith Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42962" (2016). Not Reported. 2198.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/2198

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

V.

DANA L YDELL SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

&
Minidoka Co. Case No.
CR-2004-2628

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF MINIDOKA

HONORABLERANDYJ.STOKER
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

DENNIS BENJAMIN
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay
& Bartlett LLP
303 W. Bannock
P. 0. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P. 0. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
A TTORNl;YS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

FIL

. OPY

JAN O5 2016

AUTHORITI

....................... ,. .................. i

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case ................................................................................ 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ......................... 1
ISSUES .................................................................................................................2
ARGUMENT .........................................................................................................3
I.

II.

Failure To Order A Psychiatric Evaluation Is Not An
Issue That Can Be Properly Raised Or Considered
In A Rule 35 Motion Brought Long After The 120-Day
Deadline Has Passed ..................................................................... 3
A.

Introduction ......................................................................... 3

B.

Standard Of Review .............................................................. 3

C.

The District Court's Allegedly Erroneous
Failure To Order A Psychiatric Evaluation
For Sentencing Did Not Render The Sentence
Illegal. .................................................................................... 3

The District Court Did Not Err By Not Appointing
Counsel Because It Lacked Jurisdiction Over The
Case ................................................................................................7
A.

Introduction .......................................................................... 7

B.

Standard Of Review .......................................................... 7

C.

Smith Was Not Entitled TefCounsel Because
The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction ................................... 7

CONCLUSiON .....................................................................................................8
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ................................................................................ 9

918, 828

1323 (Ct. App. 1992) ......................... 7

State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 272 P.3d 417 (2012) ...................................... 3
Statev. Clements, 148 Idaho 82,218 P.3d 1143 (2009) .....

. .............. 4

State v. Fox, 122 Idaho 550, 835 P.2d 1361 (Ct. App. 1992) ............................... 4
State v. Smith, 2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 467,
Docket Nos. 35216/35604 (Idaho App. May 20, 2009) ............................. 1
State v. Sutton, 113 Idaho 832, 748 P.2d 416 (Ct. App. 1987) ............................ 4
State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 873 P.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1994) ............................. 8
Swisher v. State, 129 Idaho 467, 926 P.2d 1314 (Ct. App. 1996) .................... 7, 8

STATUTES
I.C. § 18-210 ....................................................................................................... 6
I.C. § 18-211 ........................................................................................................ 6
I.C. § 18-212 ........................................................................................................ 6
I.C. § 18-215 ....................................................................................................... 6

I.C. § 18-2408(2)(a) .............................................................................................. 4
I.C. § 19-852(b)(3) ............................................................................................. 8
RULi=S
I.C.R. 35 ................................................................................................... 1, 2, 3, 4

Dana Lydell Smith appeals from

d

order denying

recent Rule 35 motion.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The district court sentenced Smith to a term of 14 years with seven years
determinate upon his conviction for grand theft, entering judgment on March 31,
2008. (#35216 R., vol. II, pp. 435-39.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed.
State v. Smith, 2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 467, Docket Nos. 35216/35604
(Idaho App. May 20, 2009).
On January 16, 2015, Smith filed a "Motion for Correction or Reduction of
Sentence" pursuant to I.C.R. 35. (R., pp. 50-52 (capitalization altered).) Smith
claimed his sentence was illegal because the district court had not ordered a
psychiatric evaluation for sentencing. (R., p. 51.) The district court denied the
motion, reasoning that Smith was claiming to have been sentenced in an illegal
manner, which, because the motion was not brought within 120 days, was
untimely. (R., pp. 53-54.) Smith filed a notice of appeal timely from the district
court's order. (R., pp. 65-67.)

1

the

on

as:

1.

Is a sentence imposed upon a defendant who has
found to be incompetent to stand trial but never found to
have been restored to competency an illegal sentence which
can be corrected
any time under I.C.R 35(a)?

2.

Alternatively, did the court err in failing to rule on the motion
for appointment of counsel in light of the meritorious motion?

(Appellant's brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1

Has Smith failed to show error in the district court's holding that failure to
order a psychiatric evaluation for sentencing is not an issue that can be
properly raised or considered in a Rule 35 motion brought after the 120day deadline has passed?

2.

Was Smith not entitled to counsel because the district court lacked
jurisdiction?
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I.
Raised Or Considered in A Ruie 35 Motion Brought Lonq After The 120-Day
Deadline Has Passed
A.

Introduction
The district court concluded that Smith's claim that the court erred by not

ordering a psychiatric evaluation for sentencing was a claim that his sentence
had been imposed in an illegal manner, and was therefore untimely because not
brought within 120 days as required by I.C.R. 35(b).

(R., pp. 53-54.)

Smith

argues that his competency at sentencing "is not a claim that the sentence was
imposed in an illegal manner" but is instead a challenge to "the court's power to
impose a sentence at all" and that "the illegality of the sentence is apparent from
the face of the record." (Appellant's brief, p. 6.) Review shows Smith's argument
is without merit

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a sentence is illegal or was imposed in an illegal manner is

question of free review.

State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 485, 272 P.3d 417,

457 (2012).

C.

The District Court's Allegedly Erroneous Failure To Order A Psychiatric
Evaluation For Sentencing Did Not Render The Sentence Illegal
A motion to correct a sentence that was imposed in an illegal manner

"must be filed within 120 days of the entry of the judgment imposing sentence."
i.C.R. 35(b). The 120-day filing limit of Rule 35(b) is jurisdictional, and therefore
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13
550, 835 P.2d 1361 (Ct. App. 1

described

filing dead

[Rule 35] create a jurisdictional limitation on the authority of the trial court to
entertain motions under the rule.

Without a timely filing, the court cannot

consider the motion." (internal citations omitted)).
In contrast to the jurisdictional time limit imposed upon a claim the
sentence was imposed in an illegal manner, a district court "may correct a
sentence that is illegal from the face of the record at any time."

!.C.R. 35(a).

This language, however, is "narrowly interpreted as a sentence that is illegal from
the face of the record, i.e., does not involve significant questions of fact or require
an evidentiary hearing." State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 86, 218 P.3d 1143,
1147 (2009).
In this case Smith was sentenced to 14 years with seven years
determinate upon his conviction for grand theft, a facially legal sentence. I.C. §
18-2408(2)(a) (grand theft punishable by up to 14 years in prison). He moved for
a reduction of his sentence from 14 years to eight years because he was
"mentally incompetent and was tried, convicted, sentence[d] and convicted [sic]
while Defendant was incompetent" making his mental health a "factor" at
sentencing.

(R., pp. 51-52 (capitalization altered).) Specifically, he claimed his

sentence was "illegal as there was no psychiatric exam as per I.C. § 19-2522"
and the judge "struck" the mitigating mental health evidence. (Id.) Because the
sentence is facially legal and the only illegality claimed-that
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district court did

manner in
it lacked jurisdiction over
On appeal Smith's counsel argues that his sentence was illegal because
the "record plainly shows that Mr. Smith was found to be incompetent and
trial court never found he had been restored to competency" and therefore the
district court was legally "barred ... from sentencing him." (Appellant's brief, p.
7.) Besides being a different claim than raised below, this argument is based on
a false assertion.

Nowhere in the record is there any finding that Smith was

incompetent.
There is in the record evidence relevant to Smith's competency. Attached
to the PSI are several psychological evaluations.

Dr. Smith's May 2, 2007,

evaluation reports that Smith can "understand the proceedings against him," the
"roles of the various players in the court process," and "the possible
consequences he is facing." (Smith Evaluation, p. 8 (attached to #35216 PSI).)
However, Smith's "ability to assist in his own defense presents a question"
because his tendency to "ramble off rather inappropriately . . . likely seriously
impairs his ability to work systematically with his attorney in a sustained fashion."
(Id.)

However, once the proper medications "become effective" Smith "could in

all likelihood proceed with matters in court." (Id.) According to a subsequent
mental health report, prepared on November 8, 2007, and also attached to the
PSI, Smith does not suffer from a "major mental illness," but rather a "personality
disorder" that causes Smith to "act out" if he does not get what he wants.
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on

16

, p.

was

on 3/31/08).) At

a

"

could be made only after an evidentiary hearing, held either before sentencing or
in response to the Rule 35 motion. Smith's appellate counsel's claim that there
was a "finding" he was incompetent is false and misleading.
Even if not premised on a false assertion, Smith's argument would still be
without merit.

The Idaho Code prohibits sentencing a mentally incompetent

person "so long as such incapacity endures," I.C. § 18-210, and also establishes
a detailed procedure for determining such incapacity and its duration, I.C. §§ 18211, 18-212, 18-215. Under this procedure the question of competency "shall be
determined by the court," and if the court finds the defendant incompetent to
proceed it must generally suspend the proceedings. I.C. § 18-212(1) and (2). To
the extent Smith claims the trial court erred by finding him competent; making no
finding on his competency; or by failing to suspend the proceedings until he was
determined to be competent, such are claims the sentence was imposed in an
illegal manner.

Indeed, if such error were demonstrated by a timely Rule 35

motion or on appeal, there is nothing in the law that would prohibit imposition of
the exact same ~entence upon Smith once he is determined to be competent. It
is not the sentence that Smith claims on appeal to be illegal, only the manner by
which it was imposed upo~him.
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11.
The District Court Did Not Err By Not Appointing Counsel Because It Lacked
Jurisdiction Over The Case
A.

Introduction
Smith claims the district court erred by not appointing counsel to represent

him on his Rule 35 motion. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-11.) Because the district
court lacked jurisdiction, Smith has failed to show reversible error.

B.

Standard Of Review
Denial of court appointed counsel under I.C. § 19-852(b )(3) is "within the

court's discretion" as long as "the court appropriately finds that the claims
presented are frivolous."

Swisher v. State, 129 Idaho 467, 468-69, 926 P.2d

1314, 1315-16 (Ct. App. 1996) (addressing appointment of counsel in postconviction proceedings).

C.

Smith Was Not Entitled To Counsel Because The District Court Lacked
Jurisdiction
A criminal defendant has the statutory right to counsel at all stages of the

criminal process, including pursuit of a Rule 35 motion.

Murray v. State, 121

Idaho 918, 923 n.3, 828 P.2d 1323, 1328 n.3 (Ct. App. 1992). However, the trial
court may deny appointment of counsel if the Rule 35 motion is frivolous or one
that a reasonable person with adequate means would not be willing to bring at
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or

I.

1

.

A

is
is

on

documentation that may support the motion. State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 525,
873 P.2d 167, 270 (Ct. App. 1994). Thus, a district court is within its discretion to
deny a request for court appointed counsel under I.C. § 19-852(b)(3) if it
appropriately finds, after reviewing the contents of the motion, that the claims
presented are frivolous. Swisher, 129 Idaho at 468-69, 926 P.2d at 1315-16.
As shown above, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the
motion.

Because the court lacked jurisdiction, it also lacked jurisdiction to

appoint counsel for Smith to pursue his motion. Smith has shown no error. 1

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
denial of Smith's Rule 35 motion.
DATED this 5th day of January, 2016.

Deputy Attorney Gene al

Because the district court lacked jurisdiction over the Rule 35 motion, even if the
district court had jurisdiction to consider the motion for appointment of counsel
any failure to rule on it was also necessarily harmless. Swisher v. State, 129
Idaho 467, 470-471, 926 P.2d 1314, 1317-1318 (Ct. App. 1996) (district court's
failure to consider motion for appointed counsel before dismissing postconviction action was harmless error because Swisher's claims were timebarred, and therefore frivolous).
1
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